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The signature of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty was a major step in the 
development of the European Union (EU). It represented not only 
the key moment of the introduction of the single currency, but also 
the result of difficult negotiations during which important initial 
objectives fell by the wayside, notably the idea to accompany economic 
and monetary union (EMU) with stronger political integration. The 
financial and public debt crisis that started in 2008, as well as its 
later political fall-out, could hence be seen as the result of a political 
structure inadequate to foster economic and monetary integration. 
Therefore, a historical evaluation of the political context which led to 
this outcome of the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) seems 
appropriate.
The European Parliament (EP) was an important actor in the 
preparatory phase and during the Intergovernmental Conference. 
Generally positively inclined towards stronger political integration 
as well as economic and monetary union different political families 
within Parliament nevertheless attached different weights to the two 
principal objectives. Parliamentary debates, resolutions and activities 
leading to Maastricht and the single currency are thus an important 
source to understand the context of monetary union. Different ideas 
and narratives preceded the decision to create a single currency. 
There were those who advocated more economic convergence and 
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political integration before monetary union, on one side, 
and proponents of the neo-functionalist approach on the 
other. The latter claimed that the single currency would 
draw the Union towards more economic integration and 
would finally even be conducive to political integration.
The aim of the EP-EUI EU History Roundtable held on 
31 May 2017 was to analyse the theories, ideas and models 
related to monetary union, such as Optimum Currency 
Area theory, monetarist and ordo-liberal thoughts or 
the so-called coronation theory of monetary integration. 
Contributions included institutionalist analyses as well 
as empirical economic and financial regulation research. 
The question whether EMU had an impact on European 
constitutionalisation was also examined.
Anthony Teasdale, Director General of the European 
Parliamentary Research Service, welcomed the event on 
one of the key episodes of the history of the European 
Parliament and the institutional history of the EU as an 
excellent occasion to deepen the knowledge on both and 
to ensure that the institutional memory of the European 
Parliament on one of the most defining steps in European 
integration was preserved.
In his opening remarks, Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso, 
Vice-President of the European Parliament, highlighted 
that in most eurozone countries there was still consensus 
that EMU brought benefits to its members, and even to 
non-eurozone member states. However, as a result of the 
long double crisis of the banking sector and sovereign 
debt in Europe, many EU member state economies faced 
difficult social re-adjustment processes. Yet, regardless 
of voices pleading in favour of abandoning the euro in 
some countries, member states would need to collectively 
develop and apply new mechanisms to detect, prevent, 
and correct problematic economic trends. 
Vice-President Valcárcel underlined the enormous 
importance of economic convergence of eurozone 
economies, in indicators such as labour costs, inflation, 
productivity, or growth, but, at the same time, conceded 
that transferring highly sensitive responsibilities from 
national authorities to the European level was no easy 
endeavour. The recent calls for an economic and social 
union, inter alia by Emmanuel Macron, then minister 
of the economy, and his German counterpart, Sigmar 
Gabriel, hence agreed on the need for a staged process 
of convergence that involved not only structural reforms 
(labour market, business environment) and institutional 
reforms (to improve the functioning of economic 
governance), but also social and tax convergence (e.g. 
minimum wages and a harmonised corporate tax) to 
strengthen individual economies, establish a level playing 
field across the eurozone, and avoid downward tax 
competition and social dumping.
Regarding Parliament’s contribution to tackling the 
financial and debt crisis, Valcárcel highlighted its newly 
won powers. After the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the EP had participated in the detailed regulation 
of the eurozone. This involved, inter alia, the preventive 
part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), as well as 
more diligent macroeconomic surveillance to prevent 
harmful imbalances following the financial crisis. The 
so-called ‘Six-Pack’ also strengthened Parliament’s role 
in the economic governance of the EU, in particular 
through the introduction of the ‘European Semester’ 
and the installation of an ‘Economic Dialogue’. The 
EP, moreover, very early on called for an extensive 
application of the powers of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) provided for under the Treaty – i.e. its obligation 
to determine the monetary policy pursued. Yet, the 
ECB’s prerogatives should, according to Parliament, be 
balanced by democratic accountability. To this end, the 
‘Monetary Dialogue’ was introduced: The President of 
the ECB, or another member of its Governing Council, 
appears before the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs at least once every three 
months to answer questions on the economic outlook and 
to justify the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area. 
In addition, the European Parliament routinely delivers 
an opinion on the ECB’s annual report in the context of 
an own-initiative report.
Another example of new rules was the so-called 
‘Legislative Two-Pack’, which entered into force in 2013, 
concerning the scrutiny and assessment of the budgets of 
the eurozone countries by the Commission. Here and in 
other situations where the EP possessed decision-making 
powers, e.g. with respect to the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), it was able to obtain concessions from 
the member states and to advance its influence.
In addition, Parliament was consulted on a number of 
important issues:
• Agreements on exchange rates between the euro and 
non-EU currencies;
• Choice of countries eligible to join the single currency;
• Appointment of the President, Vice-President and 
other members of the ECB Executive Board;
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• Legislation implementing the excessive deficit proce-
dure provided for in the Stability and Growth Pact;
• General measures necessary for the use of the euro as 
single currency.
Vice-President Valcárcel closed his introduction with an 
outlook on potential future elements of EMU based on 
the so-called ‘Five Presidents Report’:
• Further Parliamentarisation: The European Parliament 
could engage in a plenary debate before the Annual 
Growth Survey is presented, and continue the debate 
following its adoption. A second dedicated plenary 
debate could be held upon presentation by the Com-
mission of its Country-Specific Recommendations, 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the ‘Six-
Pack’ on economic dialogue.
• External role of the euro zone: There is a lack of uni-
form representation of the EU and the euro area in the 
international financial institutions. This fragmented 
voice means tha tthe EU is punching below its polit-
ical and economic weight as each euro area member 
state speaks individually. This is particularly true in the 
case of the IMF, despite the efforts made to coordinate 
European positions.
• Integrating intergovernmental legal instruments: Inte-
gration of intergovernmental legal instruments created 
during the crisis into the legal framework of the Euro-
pean Union is already foreseen in the Treaty on Sta-
bility, Coordination and Governance and should inte-
grate also other agreements, such as the Euro Plus Pact 
and the intergovernmental agreement on the Single 
Resolution Fund. Moreover, in the medium-term, also 
the governance of the European Stability Mechanism 
should be fully integrated into the EU treaties.
Concluding, Vice-President Valcárcel underlined that the 
challenge facing the euro was a political one: would there 
be sufficient political will to create the arrangements 
needed for a successful currency union, or would the 
high political costs associated with this mean that Europe 
would have to endure an unsatisfactory system that could 
jeopardize its legitimacy with many citizens? In light of 
this political challenge, the future of the euro strongly 
depended on the right combination of solidarity, fiscal 
prudence and European-level instruments in supervision 
and crisis management.
In his keynote speech, Roberto Gualtieri, Chairman of 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs welcomed the opportunity to go beyond 
the current political events and to shed some light on the 
theoretical and historical foundations of the creation of 
EMU. Recalling the fundamental difference between the 
exclusive EU powers related to monetary integration and 
the shared competence between the EU and the member 
states in economic policy, he assessed this to be one 
important explanation of the asymmetries of the EMU. 
A further essential feature were the provisions in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) concerning 
monetary union, notably its Art. 123 and 125 containing 
the so-called nobail-out cause; in addition, there was only 
a budget for the single market, not for a financial union, 
and this was subject to the unanimity rule as regards the 
EU’s own resources. All this led to what could be called 
an incomplete, asymmetric construction.
According to Gualtieri, in orthodox economics, three 
theoretical assumptions framed the functioning of EMU:
• Output and employment fluctuated in response to 
external shocks on aggregate supply and demand;
• Economic shocks were absorbed through short-term 
variation of volumes, due to imperfect information 
transmission in markets and typical incentives for pri-
vate agents to react to price changes;
• Neither fiscal nor monetary intervention on aggregate 
demand could significantly alter potential output and 
the unemployment rate, leading mainly to increased 
inflation.
However, the Maastricht treaty and the definition of EMU 
within it was not simply the result of economic ideas and 
models. For a full account, an encompassing historical and 
political analysis was needed to highlight the policy area 
under the assumptions of different theoretical schools 
of thought on the dynamics of European integration, 
such as intergovernmentalism or neo-functionalism, 
which in a multi-dimensional approach took into 
account bargaining within and between member states, 
domestic politics, and the role of experts and ideas. 
Gualtieri underlined that there were excellent accounts, 
for instance, of France’s approach to EMU, scrutinising 
the views of the French administrative elite on the Franc 
fort policy and European power politics in general. The 
role of American monetary unilateralism, the strength of 
the Deutschmark and of German unification are also well 
known. Some key players in France eventually accepted 
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German strategic positions during the crucial period 
from 1988 to 1991 (e.g. Jacques Delors and Jacques de 
Larosière). Nevertheless, some studies of the so-called 
‘battle of ideas’ between France (‘political discretion’) and 
Germany (‘respect for rules’) are not fully convincing. 
Ideas and objectives werecontested between different 
epistemic communities also within member states.
Over the early years, many observers thought that the 
asymmetry between the monetary and the economic part 
of EMU could work, if sufficient budgetary buffers were 
built up by euro area members in good times. However, 
the persistent structural differences between national 
economies were mainly compensated through a quasi-
private financial transfer system run by major banks, 
moving financial resources from rich euro countries to 
the periphery. This amplified the European sovereign 
debt crisis triggered by an originally US-based problem.
On the other hand, the crisis also triggered relevant 
changes in eurozone governance:
• The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was created, 
with a strong emphasis on conditionality of financial 
support.
• The ECB became involved in massive open market 
operations such as the Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT).
• A second reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 
2011 and, a few months later, the creation of the Euro-
pean Fiscal Compact.
Again, the outcome of these negotiations was a political 
trade-off between public opinions in member states and 
financial governance requirements.
Roberto Gualtieri noted a slightly paradoxical 
introduction of much stricter rules, on the one hand, and 
the acceptance of more flexibility on the other. The role 
of the Commission and the European Parliament was 
essential for finding such a compromise and balanced 
to some extent German insistence on fiscal discipline 
and the insertion of balanced budget rules in national 
constitutions. Of particular importance was the final 
phrasing of Art. 2 and 3 of the Fiscal Compact. While 
Art. 2 provides that the Fiscal Compact is only valid if 
its provisions are compatible with EU law, notably the 
Stability Pact and the treaty, Art. 3 contains a modified 
definition of what a balanced budget is, as defined 
by the European Commission. Hence, even in an 
intergovernmental setting, European dynamics and EU 
law had a strong impact.
Even though one may say that many aspects of the 
current governance structure are the result of rapid 
responses to the crisis rather than of the implementation 
of a clear design there clearly are very coherent and 
logical components such as the evolving banking union, 
which hopefully will lead to a more sustainable financial 
integration of the eurozone. Gualtieri expressed his 
conviction that the current construction is suboptimal, 
but not unsustainable and that it could gradually be 
made more coherent. A leap into a fully-fledged fiscal, 
federalised Union was hence not the only possible 
solution.
The Commission’s Reflection Paper on the Deepening 
of the EMU would certainly also reflect some ideas 
submitted by the European Parliament in three recent 
reports that aimed to strike a balance between a strict 
convergence code and the creation of an EU fiscal capacity 
to absorb future shocks. A completed banking union and 
a coordinated aggregate fiscal stance of member states 
could therefore become a sound foundation of eurozone 
governance. Moreover, growth-friendly economic 
policies such as those included in the Commission’s 
country-specific recommendations, although not yet 
implemented in a perfect way, were an important step 
towards a more coordinated fiscal policy.
Finally, Roberto Gualtieri stressed that democratic 
scrutiny had to be applied at the level at which 
decisions were taken, through an intelligent multi-level 
enhancement of parliamentary control. No treaty change 
was required for that, just the political will to create a 
dynamic eurozone as the internal engine of a stronger EU 
in a global context.
After these introductory remarks, the discussion dealt 
with core economic concepts and ideas behind economic 
and monetary union, including reflections on the EP’s 
role in the run-up to EMU; the intellectual masterminds 
behind EMU; models that help track the gaps and flaws 
in EMU’s architecture; and observations on the nascent 
banking union.
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The European Parliament on the Road to 
the Maastricht Treaty
To lay the ground for the discussion, Angelos Delivorias, 
policy analyst from EPRS’s Members’ Research 
Service, spoke on important milestones on the way 
to the Maastricht treaty. He focused on the European 
Parliament’s positions expressed in numerous resolutions 
in reply to major policy reports (such as the Werner, 
Delors or Christophersen reports) or events (such as 
the Smithsonian agreement or the Single European Act 
(SEA)). After a brief look at the situation in the 1950s and 
1960s, he focused on the period from 1970 to 1993. 
Due to the existence of a general framework for trade and 
payments (Bretton-Woods, GATT, OEEC, EPU, EMA), 
missing EC membership of the United Kingdom (GBP) 
and the overall stability of the international monetary 
situation, the 1950s and 1960s did not witness much talk 
about an European economic and monetary union. The 
declared focus of this period rather laid on establishing a 
common market, a customs union and common policies. 
However, during the 1960s the European unit of account 
(EUA) was created. As a reaction to the balance of 
payments issues in the United States of America (USA), 
the devaluation of the French Franc and revaluation of 
the Deutschmark, first ideas for an EMU were formulated 
at the end of the 1960s, especially in the Barre Plan, The 
Hague Summit, and the Werner Plan. The latter envisaged 
a three-stage process to achieve EMU within a period of 
ten years. As a reaction to the Werner Plan, the EP called 
for national and Community competences to be specified 
and for itself to exercise democratic control over those 
competences. It, moreover, asked to be consulted on 
important decisions concerning EMU. On the occasion of 
the Smithsonian agreement that followed the temporary 
suspension of US Dollar convertibility into gold in 1971, 
the EP placed great hopes on the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF) as an intervention tool into 
European currency markets and called for greater powers 
for the Commission. In a subsequent 1973 resolution on 
the reform of the international monetary system, the EP 
called for a dominant place of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) in the composition of currency reserves and for 
interest rate policy coordination to address disruptive 
effects of international capital.
Yet, it was only in 1978 that the debate on EMU got 
new impetus from France and Germany, leading to the 
European Council meetings of Bremen and Brussels 
as well as to the proposal for a European Monetary 
System (EMS). The EP remained critical of the proposals 
of Bremen and asked for more control, a common 
economic policy and convergent member States policies. 
After the Brussels European Council, while adopting a 
more conciliatory tone and welcoming the EMS, the EP 
repeated its call for more convergence of national and 
Community economic policies. 
Within the EMS period until 1987, several EP resolutions 
called for measures to extend the use of the European 
Currency Unit (ECU) to control inflation, to draw up 
proposals for an international monetary agreement to 
counteract policies of third countries (like the USA), for 
Member States (such as the UK) to join and for others 
(like Italy) to abandon exception rules. Reacting to the 
Hannover European Council and the Delors report, EP 
resolutions on the road to Maastricht (1988 to 1992) called 
for greater integration between national economic and 
fiscal policies and for the role of the ECU to be extended 
to private transactions. Moreover, on the Christophersen 
report, the EP issued a resolution that agreed with the 
obligatory nature of EMU, while it called for greater EP 
powers over EMU, especially in view of the appointment 
of the governor and the board of the Central Bank, than 
the report offered (as it proposed only consultation), and 
the orientation and harmonisation of economic policies.
Concluding his presentation, Angelos Delivorias focused 
on the EP’s resolutions during the IGC on the Maastricht 
treaty. There, the EP agreed with the conclusions on the 
coordination of monetary policies and the convergence 
of economic performance, defended a central role for 
itself in EMU and demanded co-decision for specific 
agreements. It, however, did neither discuss the capital/
payments sections of the treaty, nor the debt-to-GDP 
criterion ceilings (3% and 60%). In its conclusions to 
the IGC, the EP underlined the fact that the new treaty 
failed to provide any economic policy authority with 
adequate democratic legitimacy to counterbalance the 
autonomous monetary policy of the ECB. It also deplored 
the fact that the scope of Parliamentary influence would 
suffer at national and European level through reduced 
parliamentary control, and hence the loss of disciplinary 
power that was not compensated by more powers for the 
EP.
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The Architects of the Euro
Ivo Maes, Senior Advisor for Historical Studies of 
the National Bank of Belgium and Professor at the 
UC Louvain, discussed key ideational moments in 
the making of EMU. He particularly portrayed key 
intellectuals driving EMU’s development and analysed 
the role and legacy of these architects of the euro, whose 
task it was to design a workable and sustainable monetary 
union. They were institutionally embedded actors, most 
typically in the European Commission or in European 
central banking, or both. Their expert role was providing 
substantive policy knowledge and managing the complex 
negotiation processes through their networking skills. 
They were exceptional actors at the interfaces of politics 
and academia as well as in national and European affairs. 
Maes’ key insights were the reassertion of the value of 
biographical study, the claim that biography indeed 
mattered in the context of the evolving EMU and the 
fact that the nature of EMU was the true product of the 
individual intelligences of its original architects. 
Presenting empirical evidence from a co-edited volume 
with Kenneth Dyson, Ivo Maes focused on 10 key 
actors in the development of the Euro. He reconstructed 
the situations of constraint and choice in which the 
architects of the euro operated and he alluded to parts 
of the urgency of the moment and teleological biases 
in narratives about EMU. He underlined that designing 
EMU was not simply a matter of realising a pre-formed 
economic or political vision. Under the conditions of a 
tight, politically defined timetable, the process was more 
one of precipitate self-revelation. The political patrons of 
EMU defined the institutional venues in which EMU was 
to be designed and vetoed certain matters as not suitable 
for further consideration. The main sources of the tactical 
and psychological advantage of the architects of the euro 
derived from the general lack of experience in economic, 
financial and monetary issues on the part of their political 
leaders.
7 ■ EMU - 25 Years after Maastricht: Historical Challenges, Economic Ideas, Political Solutions
According to Maes, the biographical study of the 
architects of the euro showed that they were bound 
together by certain shared, often implicit, understandings, 
which helped to define a discourse about Europe and to 
forge mutual consensus. A key factor in their personal 
backgrounds was the ‘shadow of history’ and a common 
generational experience, with shared memories rooted 
in World War II. They were part of the generation of 
post-1945 reconstruction, dedicated to creating a more 
civilised Europe founded on cooperation through trade, 
investment, growth and employment. Another common 
reference point were the problems of the Bretton Woods 
system and its eventual collapse in 1971-73. The search 
for monetary stability was hence a shared preoccupation 
of the architects. They also had in common their 
Europeanised experience in building and working 
within new institutional frameworks, from the European 
Payments Union to the European Economic Community 
and beyond. Finally, as loyal public servants, they were 
aware of the limits of their expertise, as they had to work 
within the constraints of political mandates. 
According to Maes, notwithstanding their shared 
understandings, the architects of the euro differed in 
their views on EMU. These differences become apparent 
in their positions on a supranational EMU. While 
Raymond Barre was reluctant, Robert Marjolin, Karl-
Otto Pöhl, and Hans Tietmeyer were cautiously positive, 
whilst most others supported it. A similar variety of 
views was apparent as regards monetary cooperation 
before the final stage of EMU. Again, Pöhl and Tietmeyer 
were reluctant, Barre, Alexandre Lamfalussy and Pierre 
Werner were cautiously positive, while Jacques Delors, 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and others were in favour.
Monetary cooperation  
in the first stage
A supranational EMU




Cautiously positive Barre   Werner 
Lamfalussy




With respect to the legacy of the architects, Maes 
highlighted that they – by and large – escaped the charge 
of being responsible for the flaws of EMU. The causes 
of EMU’s weaknesses rather included the imperfect 
knowledge that centralised decision-makers possessed in 
a highly heterogeneous EMU, characterised not just by 
local structural differences, but also by varying economic 
cultures. 
While the architects all had serious doubts and 
reservations on EMU, they differed in the precise objects 
of concern. For some, like Pöhl and Tietmeyer, but also 
Padoa-Schioppa and Delors, European political union 
was the missing headstone. EMU required deep reserves 
of democratic legitimacy at the European level that were 
however lacking, not least to ensure compliance with 
fiscal rules. For Roy Jenkins and others of a Keynesian 
persuasion the prime requirement was a counter-cyclical 
stabilisation facility. As the international consensus 
shifted towards active fiscal stimulus to kick-start 
economic growth, the euro area was perceived as poorly 
designed to deliver. Robert Triffin’s much earlier proposal 
for a European Reserve Fund had pointed the way to 
provision of a risk-sharing facility to give member states 
time and support to adjust. Last, but not least, Alexandre 
Lamfalussy, from his time at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), had identified the problem of macro-
prudential supervision and regulation. 
8 ■  RSCAS | July 2017
Economic Concepts and Ideas behind 
EMU
Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Senior Adviser in Directorate 
General Research at the European Central Bank (ECB), 
and honorary Professor at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
University of Frankfurt, explored the explanatory 
potential of key theories, ideas and models related to 
EMU. He focussed on three theoretical frameworks 
developed to explain adjustment processes, policies, and 
shared institutional settings. Each of these approaches 
had an empirical dimension and left room for national 
customisation. Moreover, each model was ‘harmed’ in 
reality by bad governance, poor political economy, slow 
reforms, a lack of dynamism and foremost by the legacy 
of the crisis. The approaches included the ‘Swan Diagram’ 
discussing the trade-off between internal and external 
balances, Bela Balassa’s work on regional integration, and 
Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory.
The ‘Swan Diagram’, elaborated by the Australian 
economist Trevor Swan in the 1950s focuses on two 
types of imbalances. Internal Balance (IB) portrays 
the combination of the exchange rate and domestic 
expenditure in which productive resources are fully 
employed and there is no unemployment and/or inflation; 
while External Balance (EB) describes the combination in 
which the Current Account is in balance. Applied to the 
current crisis, the Swan Diagram offered the following 
insight into the eurozone crisis as it helped visualise big 
imbalances, and macro-parameters going in opposite 
directions.
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Grounded in Optimum Currency Area theory, Bela 
Balassa assigned scores to the level of institutional 
regional integration among partner countries. In this 
way, he identifies five main stages of integration (Free 
In this way, Balassa’s Index of institutional regional 
integration measured shared institutions and 
political economy, while national transposition and 
Trade, Custom Union, Common Market, Economic 
Union, Total Economic Integration). In Mongelli’s view, 
these five stages would develop in Europe in parallel.
implementation of policies and institutions remained a 
challenge.
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Finally, according to a simplified version of key 
assumptions of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
theory, in order to have a stable and beneficial EMU, euro 
area countries would need to be
• ‘Open’ vis-à-vis each other in terms of trade in goods 
and services, as well as financial integration;
• ‘Flexible & Adaptable’ in terms of domestic prices, 
wages and costs of production, but also in terms of 
mobility and adaptability of labour and other factors 
of production (geographical, occupational, and 
industry mobility); and
• ‘Synchronised’ with each other. There needs 
to be income correlation and business cycle 
synchronisation.
Applying these criteria to the current Eurozone situation, 
Mongelli presented the following results:
In general, OCA theory articulated openness, flexibility 
and correlation and highlights trade-offs. Applied to the 
Eurozone, OCA theory hence showed that the benefits 
of sharing the euro rested on high scores across all OCA 
properties.
Applying all three theories and approaches to the current 
eurozone crisis and the solutions proposed to fight it, 
Mongelli concluded that an exceptional and changing 
crisis had been met by formidable policy responses and 
that the new governance structures are working in ways 
that are slowly becoming apparent. At the same time, 
the four new Unions were charting a course toward a 
resilient EMU within the EU and the euro area sharing a 
‘constitutional framework’ that is new in its formulation. 
If it was upon the choice of EU member states, Mongelli 
assumed that today most countries would probably like 
to pursue more ordo-liberal policies to avoid a repetition 
of a sovereign debt crisis. At the same time, several 
risk-reduction and risk-sharing mechanisms would 
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need strengthening and, provided that the different 
scores under the three frameworks would show signs of 
improvement, addressing the crisis legacy might set in 
motion benign feedback loops and support adjustment 
processes.
The Banking Union’s Fiscal Backstop 
Pierre Schlosser, Scientific Coordinator of the Florence 
School of Banking and Finance at the European 
University Institute, continued by focussing on the 
banking union. In his presentation, he especially 
highlighted Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa’s role in the 
foundation of EMU, energetically advocating a European 
supervisory framework, insisting on the constitution of a 
European payments system and defending an embedded 
ECB, which would otherwise have risked suffering from 
‘institutional loneliness’. 
Moreover, Padoa-Schioppa was a firm believer in 
discretionary liquidity support. In light of EMU’s original 
architecture, according to Schlosser, Padoa-Schioppa 
noticed that ‘crisis management is the issue on which 
most of the criticism of the present arrangements has 
concentrated in the early years of the euro. It has been 
argued that in euroland responsibilities to manage a 
banking (or more broadly financial) crisis are neither 
clearly assigned nor openly disclosed, and that the 
sheer number of authorities potentially involved would 
make the efficient provision of emergency liquidity 
unmanageable’. The post-euro crisis framework was still 
in line with this analysis, as Schlosser maintained. 
In light of the above, Padoa-Schioppa offered to distinguish 
between three solutions to crisis management, which in 
Schlosser’s view provided a convenient and very clear way 
to look at the new geography of Europe’s banking union:
1. ‘the private money solution’ is market based and thus 
the preferable option. It includes both an ex-ante and 
an ex-post dimension. 
2. ‘the tax-payers money solution’ comes into play in 
case of a significant insolvency.
3. ‘the central bank money solution’.
Insisting on EMU’s economic theory underpinnings, 
Schlosser reviewed the so-called ‘tax-payers money 
solution’, which in his view appeared to be the weakest 
crisis management element in Europe’s current banking 
union. He argued that the ‘private money solution’ had 
been addressed by the Capital requirements (CRD IV/
CRR) package, the Resolution framework (BRRD) and 
the various resolution tools, which were all subject to the 
write down or conversion of the capital instruments of 
the Bank (SRB, 2017). Moreover, it was now reinforced by 
additional rules on subordination and liquidity provision 
as part of the new Banking Package. Crucially, the new 
Single Resolution Fund (SRM) was based on private 
sector provisions (although this was often forgotten). 
Similarly, the ‘central bank money solution’ seemed 
to have been boosted during the euro crisis with the 
incrementally growing provision of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA) and the creation of the OMT instrument 
by the ECB. The third component of crisis management 
provision that Padoa-Schioppa termed ‘the tax-payers 
money solution’, by contrast, remained under-developed 
in its current form to guarantee a sustainable EMU. 
Pierre Schlosser closed with some ideas for institutional 
improvement and the need for institutional change. 
As Simona Piattoni, Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Trento and Visiting Fellow at the European 
University Institute, commented in her discussion of the 
four contributions, it seemed fair to say that the general 
picture derived from all papers was that the creation of 
EMU and the euro did not stem from a need to sustain 
the common market (in other words, it was not the effect 
of a structural spillover), but from the coming together 
of different demands that, for different reasons, found a 
common answer: 
• Germany’s need to keep the appreciation of the 
Deutschmark under control, France’s desire to 
strengthen its own currency, and Italian Treasury 
authorities’ wish to put a brake on the escalation of 
inflation and the depreciation of the Lira. 
• Germany needed to impose discipline on the other 
countries without becoming committed to helping 
them in case of need; other member states (F, I, B) 
needed discipline although they suggested a more 
flexible discipline than they eventually got. 
• Supranational actors made use of this situation 
to push for the creation of (an imbalanced and 
imperfect) EMU. 
The following debate dealt with a related set of questions:
1. Was EMU a package deal in which every party 
obtained something or was it just a case of ‘Matthew 
effect’, where the stronger became stronger and the 
weak weaker? 
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2. What is the ultimate explanation for the design 
of EMU? Group-think, a mix of misguided 
supranational pressures coupled with instrumental 
intergovernmental decisions, or conflicting economic 
models? 
3. Were the European Monetary System and the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism indeed so insufficient that 
they needed to be overcome? 
4. What role, if any, did the international context and 
the alternating economic and trade performance of 
the US play?
5. Solidarity was eschewed in the construction of EMU, 
but was it traded in for solidarity in other policy 
areas, like cohesion policy? 
6. What was the input of the EP on the technicalities of 
the economic debate and the sustainability of EMU as 
well as the euro and in how far was the EP hampered 
by insufficient institutionalisation and conflicting 
partisan or ideological dynamics? 
7. Was the creation of the European Monetary Fund 
indeed necessary and the creation of European 
Banking Union truly decisive to stabilise EMU and 
the euro?
The subsequent discussion was dedicated to the 
historical constraints of and political conditions for an 
effective economic and monetary union. As historians 
of EMU have shown in a number of studies, the role of 
the eurozone’s biggest economy – Germany – has been 
a critical factor at many important junctures of EMU 
development. This was obviously not the priority of the 
other member states, nor the original institutional design 
of EMU or its predecessors, the EMS and the currency 
snake. To explain how Germany nevertheless became a 
hegemon-like actor in monetary integration, the panel 
started with an overview by Michele Chang from the 
College of Europe, Bruges, on ‘Germany and EMU, Past 
and Present’.
Germany as a (Benevolent) Hegemon?
Professor Chang first outlined the particular set of 
priorities and norms determining the policy preferences 
of the German government during most of the process 
of monetary integration. As a general strategic choice, 
Germany was particularly interested in promoting and 
institutionalising its own preferences at the international 
level. Among those were first and foremost ensuring 
low inflation and a strong external value of its currency, 
accompanied by an insistence on the respect of 
procedural and legal rules as a precondition of mutual 
trust and solidarity. The country’s strong dependence on 
export-led growth and its demographics (a population 
ageing more rapidly than in most other EU member 
states) were also determining its economic policy-
making. Germany was indeed repeatedly able to prevent 
steps towards integration that would require budgetary 
transfers between members and constrain its interests. 
For example, in 1978 a European Monetary Fund was 
proposed as a component of the EMS, but was foiled 
through opposition from the West German government 
and the Bundesbank.
However, in the course of the sovereign debt crisis the 
spate of reforms necessary to avoid the disintegration 
of the eurozone relied to a considerable extent on 
German acquiescence and willingness to make financial 
contributions, at least in the form of guarantees. A 
bail-out fund was created, the ECB acted as the euro area’s 
lender of last resort (albeit stealthily and reluctantly), and 
the supervision and, where necessary, resolution of the 
euro area’s largest banks have now been moved to the 
European level.
Over time, Germany’s positions on the main parameters 
of EMU have been fairly consistent, but some of its 
former ‘red lines’ had to be shifted in order to prevent the 
collapse of the euro area. Still, achieving further progress 
on euro area governance, such as completing banking 
union or devising a euro area stabilisation fund, will 
continue to face German hesitations unless another major 
crisis makes them all but unavoidable. The parameters 
for banking union were further explored in a historical 
perspective by the next speaker.
Enduring Ideas and Interests in EMU and 
the Banking Union
Lucia Quaglia from the University of York (UK) dealt 
with ‘Political dynamics in the construction of Economic 
and Monetary Union: Any lessons for Banking Union?’ 
Professor Quaglia’s demonstrated the path-dependency 
of the negotiating positions of major actors in EMU’s 
development and how they impact also on the ongoing 
definition of the banking union, the latest component of 
post-crisis stabilisation efforts. 
Two main political dynamics influenced the construction 
of EMU, as envisaged in the Maastricht treaty: first, 
there were economic and political ‘spill overs’ from the 
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single market and from previous European monetary 
integration, especially the functioning of the EMS. The 
European Commission argued that the gains of the 
single market could not be fully utilised without a single 
currency, notably in its influential and voluminous study 
One Market, One Money: An evaluation of the potential 
benefits and costs of forming an Economic and Monetary 
Union (1990).
On the other hand, there were intergovernmental 
dynamics, driven by the (often competing) interests and 
policy beliefs of member state authorities. The main line of 
division was between strong and weak currency countries 
– their preferences had to be reconciled in negotiations on 
EMU. Countries such as Italy and France tended to have 
higher inflation – with rates significantly above those 
in Germany – and normally ran balance of payments 
deficits, which undermined the value of their currency. 
For these countries, the establishment of EMU was seen 
and anticipated as a way to end German dominance of 
the EMS, and in particular to stop the virtual interest rate 
monopoly of the Bundesbank. In EMU, they would have 
a say in the making of a single monetary policy and a seat 
at the ECB, rather than obsequiously follow the monetary 
policy of the leading national central bank.
Of course, national preferences concerning EMU were far 
from monolithic at the domestic level. For instance, large 
German exporting firms supported EMU because the 
move to a single currency could give them a competitive 
advantage in relation to goods produced in other EU 
countries, notably France and Italy. French policy-makers 
saw EMU as the crowning of the Franc fort policy and part 
of a drive to make the country’s industry more efficient 
(competitive disinflation). In Italy, technocrats at the 
Bank of Italy and the treasury supported their country’s 
membership of the EMS and the EMU as welcome external 
constraints on domestic macroeconomic policies. In the 
UK, however, the political elite and public opinion, with 
the exception of parts of the financial industry, opposed 
the idea of a single currency, which was widely perceived 
to represent yet another step towards a federal Europe.
Addressing current policy developments towards 
establishing a banking union, Quaglia explored the 
theoretical background of the difficulties to define 
a balanced set of governing rules. Referring to Dirk 
Schoenmaker’s financial trilemma she demonstrated that 
a combination of financial stability, an internationally 
oriented banking system and nationally defined financial 
and fiscal policies is hardly sustainable. Moreover, in 
comparison to the construction of EMU, the role of the 
European Commission in the design of the banking 
union is less influential, but to a certain extent substituted 
by a more recent supranational actor, the ECB.
Finally, Lucia Quaglia underlined the importance of 
diverging narratives of the causes and solutions of the 
sovereign debt crisis in different countries. While a 
coalition led by France and including Italy, Spain and 
other countries in the euro area ‘periphery’ was keen on 
securing financial support mechanisms for ailing banks 
and sovereigns, another group, led by Germany, was 
reluctant to provide financial support to foreign ailing 
banks or their home countries’ governments. These 
countries were mainly concerned about moral hazard, 
i.e. the undesirable effect of financial support feeding into 
continued economic and fiscal profligacy in debt-ridden 
countries.
Debt Restructuring – an Old and a New 
Challenge
The rising public deficits and debts in several EMU 
member states were the topic of the intervention by 
Frédéric Allemand from the University of Luxembourg, 
speaking on ‘Debt restructuring in EMU: the known 
unknowns’. He recalled that the problem of unmanageable 
public debts and member state solvency is far from new. 
Not only during negotiations at the IGC preparing the 
Maastricht treaty the sustainability of public debt was 
one of the essential items on the agenda. It had already 
been examined since the European Council of Hanover 
in 1988. Recent debt crises having struck Mexico and 
Argentina as well as the state of New York were still 
fresh in negotiators’ memory. They unavoidably raised 
the question of how best to prevent, correct and resolve 
unsustainable levels of debt although, despite cautionary 
comments from academia, severe debt restructuring was 
seen by political leaders as rather unlikely in the case of 
developed economies such as those of the members of the 
European Community. Nevertheless, the Commission 
included member states’ budgetary situation in its annual 
economic reports.
At that time, some scholars pointed out that the 
equalisation of living standards across member states was 
one of the official goals of European integration and that 
this meant that member states would likely see support 
for another member state in financial trouble as a moral 
right, if not a legal obligation. Indeed, the European 
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Commission emphasised, too, that the no bail-out clause 
did not exclude ad hoc conditional financial assistance 
for states experiencing financial difficulties. This view was 
strongly supported by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in its November 2012 decision Pringle vs 
Ireland. The Court analysed the preparatory work leading 
to Art. 125 of the treaty and concluded that the provision 
did not exclude financial assistance to a member state in 
difficulties if it remained directly responsible of its various 
debt instruments and obligations.1
In order to master the tensions between the expectation 
of mutual solidarity and the solid management of public 
debt several solutions were, at least briefly, discussed 
during the IGC. The most far-reaching one, quickly 
dismissed as unrealistic, was to emulate inter-regional 
financial stability support in federal states. This would 
have required a strong increase of the European budget 
to about 5% of combined national budgets. Another idea 
was to let national budgetary policies only be disciplined 
by financial markets. The 1970s’ fast growing exposure 
to international capital mobility and foreign investments 
indeed subjected national budgets and debts more and 
more to the permanent scrutiny of market actors. Yet, 
another group of policy-makers proposed to introduce a 
coordination of national budgets at the European level, 
which would imply strict rules on maximum public debt 
and budgetary balance – the solution which was finally 
retained in combination with steadily increasing market 
surveillance (dual discipline).
Allemand also described how both the European 
Commission and the European Parliament on many 
occasions proposed to create a mechanism of support 
for member states in financial difficulties, combined 
with conditionality as concerns the necessary reforms to 
prevent further liquidity or solvency problems. Again, 
the CJEU confirmed the compatibility of these proposals 
with the treaty in the decision mentioned above.
One set of legal instruments is, according to Allemand, 
still insufficient for a sustainable management and 
restructuring of debt in the eurozone: debt crises, notably 
solvency risks, are only partially addressed by European 
law, being predominantly the object of intergovernmental 
1.  “The ‘no bail-out’ clause […] does not prohibit the granting of 
financial assistance by one or more Member States to a Member 
State which remains liable for its commitments to its creditors 
provided that the conditions attached to such assistance are such 
as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary 
policy.” (Judgment in Case C-370/12; Press release No 154/12, p. 
3)
instruments such as the ESM. This situation was criticised 
by the European Parliament already in its resolution of 20 
October 2010, on ‘Improving economic governance and 
the stability framework of the Union, in particular in the 
euro area’. In this resolution, Parliament stressed the need 
for a permanent crises resolution mechanism, including 
procedures for debt restructuring or orderly default and 
restructuring. This mechanism should be established in 
order to safeguard financial stability in the event of a 
sovereign- and private-debt crisis, while protecting the 
ECB’s independence.
The Difficult Road to More Solidarity
Professor Laurent Warlouzet from the Université du 
Littoral (France) analysed the ‘issue of solidarity since 
the Treaty of Rome (1957-2017)’. He recalled that under 
the Bretton-Woods system exchange rates were stable, 
but countries were periodically suffering from balance of 
payments crises. For instance, during the negotiation of 
the Treaty of Rome 1956-57 France experienced serious 
balance of payments difficulties. Hence, it argued in favour 
of and obtained the inclusion in the treaty of Art. 108 on 
‘mutual assistance’ in case of a balance of payments crisis. 
France used this article twice, in 1958 and in 1968, in 
order to get exemptions from EEC legislation in times of 
temporary financial difficulties. However, EEC member 
states concerned by a balance of payment crisis, such 
as Italy in 1964 and 1977 and the UK in 1976, usually 
turned to the IMF for assistance, not to the European 
Community.
In the 1960s, many officials, such as for instance Jean 
Monnet, the economist Robert Triffin, or the first 
commissioner for economic affairs, Robert Marjolin, had 
submitted proposals for a ‘European Reserve Fund’.  In 
1969, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt gave his support 
to Monnet’s idea of creating a Fund of Reserve. Similar 
ideas continued to be submitted throughout the 1970s, 
under difficult political circumstances. For instance, in 
March 1978, the French commissioner François-Xavier 
Ortoli emphasised the need to strengthen mechanisms of 
monetary and financial solidarity. 
When the agreement to establish the EMS was reached in 
December 1978 the heads of state or government stressed 
that they remained “firmly resolved to consolidate, not 
later than two years after the start of the scheme, into a final 
system the provisions and procedures thus created. This 
system will entail the creation of the European Monetary 
Fund.” However, as we know this fund never saw the light 
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of day. The main reason was that member states were too 
reluctant to share sovereignty on monetary matters until 
the 1990s. There also was an old cleavage between, on the 
one hand, those, who insisted on monetary solidarity, 
especially during financial crises, and those, on the other 
hand, who favoured more discipline in macroeconomic 
coordination.
These divergent views were prevalent throughout the 
1980s and surfaced many times in European Parliament 
debates. A so-called ‘transfer union’ to assist a member 
confronted with a balance-of-payments deficit was seen 
as an essential component of monetary union by some 
and as an anathema by others. During the 1990s-2000s, 
the idea of a European Monetary Fund was less 
prominent. For instance, when the French government 
of Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) pushed for EMU reform 
, the focus was on the Stability Pact, which was hence 
renamed ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ in 1997. Only the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing eurozone 
crisis led to the creation of ad hoc, and later permanent, 
mechanisms of financial solidarity. 
Conclusions
The second part of the discussion provided complementary 
views on some crucial concepts of monetary and 
economic integration over the past 25 years, including 
elements of the earlier history of monetary integration 
of the European Community before Maastricht. Centred 
around the main ideological and political cleavages of 
each period (e.g. between those arguing in favour of 
economic convergence as a precondition for monetary 
union and those seeing monetary union as political 
project in preparation of political union) they illustrate 
the long and winding road the EC/EU had to travel to 
arrive at today’s EMU. It is perhaps significant to note 
that, contrary to orthodox notions of what constitutes 
a hegemon, Germany did not succeed, ideologically, 
in imposing its own conceptions of the ideal monetary 
union to all other member states.
As Professor Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European 
University Institute, observed in her conclusion, one of 
the prominent messages of the discussion was the tenacity 
of a few core ideas and concepts that persisted during 
the entire time span it took to prepare and create today’s 
EMU. The power and impact of mostly normative beliefs 
such as economic convergence, moral hazard, respect for 
rules, or mutual solidarity should not be overestimated. 
Laffan also underlined that the current discussion was 
convened at an apposite moment, i.e. on the very day of 
the publication of the Commission ‘Reflection Paper on 
the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union’. 
The EP-EUI EU History Roundtable was thus a topical 
contribution to a historically and conceptually informed 
debate on future steps of economic and monetary 
integration, including the further sharpening of tools 
to prevent future asymmetric shocks caused by exterior 
economic developments.
Note: The graphs reproduced in this Policy Brief were 
presented by the respective speakers during the EP-EUI 
EU History Roundtable. Bibliographical references and 
further information may be obtained from the authors of 
this Policy Brief.
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